Department of Transport (Official Transcript)

In the matter of a fire on, and abandonment of, the M.V. “Delroy” in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, on July 27, 1972, with attendant loss of life.

Commission of Inquiry conducted before His Honour Judge N.S. Noel, sitting as Commissioner in the Board Room, 6th Floor, the Sir Humphrey Gilbert Bldg. on Monday, the 20th day of November, 1972.

Assessors:

Captain M.T. Frampton

Captain T.H. Goodyear

Court Clerk:

F.A.D. Pike, Esq.

Appearances:

P.D. Lewis, Q.C.  - Commission Counsel

J.A. Laurin, Esq. - for the Ministry of Transport

J. Sinnott, Esq. - for J. Petite & Sons Ltd.

Commissioner’s Report

On 27 July, 1972 at 8:50 PM, M.V. “Delroy” left Merasheen Harbour, Merasheen Island, Placentia Bay, Newfoundland bound for Arnold’s Cove, Placentia Bay. The voyage should have taken, approximately, three and one-half hours. At 10:55 PM a serious fire was discovered in the engine room, it was immediately judged to be out of control, and within ten minutes the fifteen persons on board “Delroy” abandoned the vessel, which was then traveling, approximately, eight and one-half miles per hour. They did so by using a single, sixteen foot dory. The dory overturned as soon as it was freed from the vessel. Only six persons survived the ordeal and these were taken from the water by M.V. ”Bertha Joyce” at, approximately, 1:30 AM 28 July, 1972.

“Delroy” was owned by Gerry Petite and Sons Company, Limited, English Harbour West, Newfoundland. The vessel was a wooden schooner of 82 gross registered tons and was powered by two 88 H.P. Kelvin diesel engines. She had been built during 1950 and 1951 at Burnside, Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland, by Don W. Ralph. Her cruising speed was about eight and one-half miles per hour. She had been kept in good condition and had been completely re-wired during the early months of 1972. She had been inspected by Mr. W.B. Savory, a steamship inspector, at

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Marystown, Newfoundland, on 27 June, 1972. During that inspection special attention was paid to testing the new electrical wiring. Inspection certificate, S.I.C. 22, issued 20 July, 1970, was extended to expire on 30 November 1972 following that inspection.

The vessel was being used to collect fresh fish from fishermen who were using isolated harbours on islands in Placentia Bay for the summer inshore fishery and to transport to fish to Arnolds Cove, Placentia Bay. She had been fitted with pens built in her hold to contain the necessary ice and receive the fish. At the time of the fire, she was carrying 15,300 pounds of fresh fish and about four tons of ice. The layout of the vessel was typical for a vessel of its type and can be seen from the photograph Exhibit 5. She had the usual forecastle which accommodated the galley and three crew members. The hold, amidships, accommodated the fish and ice. The engine room, aft, contained the diesel engines and two tanks for diesel fuel which were in the wings. The wheel house was built over the engine room and could be entered by a doorway on either side. The engine room was entered through a hatch in the floor of the wheelhouse, port side. The deckhouse, providing accommodations for the master and the engineer, was behind the wheelhouse and attached to it. A doorway in the wheelhouse gave the only access to the deck house.

The vessel was fitted with a radio receiver and transmitter, radar, loran and a depth finder. The radio was in the deck house and the remainder of the navigational aids were in the wheelhouse.  Parts of the mechanism of the radar equipment were situated in the deckhouse and the engine room. The wheelhouse also contained a voice pipe and bells for giving instructions to the engine room. The engines could be controlled only from the engine room. The practice was for the engineer to be in the engine room when he was required to operate the engines and to make periodic visits for maintenance and inspection.

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The engine room was not suited for the full-time attendance of the engineer and, in any event, he had other duties to perform, there being only one engineer on board.

The life saving, distress, and firefighting equipment carried by “Delroy”, complied with the regulation regarding such things, and did not differ, materially, from what is usually found on the small vessels engaged in the fishery around the coast of Newfoundland. The equipment consisted of:

1. One sixteen foot dory, complete with bailer and oars, which was carried lashed to the foredeck.
2. Flares, both rocket and handheld type, and a hand operated horn, which were stored in the deck cabin.
3. Three, foam type, two and one-half gallon fire extinguishers, one of which was in the wheelhouse and the other two being in the forecastle.
4. Six water buckets reserved for firefighting were carried on the roof of the deckhouse and one fire fighter's axe was mounted on the outside of the deckhouse.
5. Two life rings were mounted on the outside of the deckhouse and a life ring light was also carried in the deck house.
6. Each member of the crew had a lifejacket which was kept in his quarters, that is two in the deckhouse and three in the forecastle. 

The owner had provided “Delroy” with a small life boat, which was carried amidships, however, the master had put it ashore as it interfered with the loading and unloading of cargo.

“Delroy” was certified for a crew of five, including the master, and she carried such a crew. Reuben Evans was the master, he was 52 years of age. He had been a seaman for all his adult life, and had been a master for at least sixteen years. His charges were mostly small fishing vessels, in fact, “Delroy“ was his largest charge and he took charge of her in the early summer of 1972. He had been a dory fisherman on the Grand Banks, and

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was well experienced in dory use. The crew consisted of: John Yarn, mate; Leo Bullen, engineer; and William Garrett, cook. Each of these was an experienced seaman. The master referred to them as “three very good experienced men“. The fourth member of the crew was the master's son, Clarence Evans, he was sixteen and was making her first voyage as a seaman.

There was no certification for the carriage of passengers and the vessel was not suited to the carriage of passengers as she did not possess adequate accommodation nor did she carry the necessary life saving equipment. She had on board at the time of the fire, however, ten passengers. These were the family and friends of Mr. Leo Pomroy, a fisherman, who was engaged in prosecuting the inshore fishery from Merasheen. They had been at Merasheen for a short holiday and were being transported from Merasheen to Arnolds Cove, as guests. It should be pointed out that there is no public transportation system serving the island of Merasheen. The island, once inhabited, has been vacated and is now used only during the summer months by fishermen, mostly former residents, who continue to prosecute the inshore fishery from that place. These passengers were: Ellen Pomroy, Regina Pomroy, Sheila Pomroy, William Pomroy, Linda Pomroy, Loyola Pomroy, Carmel Pitcher (nee Pomroy), Ernest Pitcher, all of Placentia, Newfoundland and Marjorie Ennis and Judy Snow both of St. John’s, Newfoundland.

“Delroy” made daily trips between Merasheen and Arnold’s Cove and Captain Evans had agreed, earlier in the week, to bring the passengers from the island to Arnold’s Cove on 27 July. 

The passengers came on board “Delroy” shortly before 8:50 PM on 27 July, 1972 and, at that time, the vessel left for Arnolds Cove. It was a calm clear evening, and the sea was smooth. Shortly after departure from Merasheen, Captain Evans used the radio to communicate with Raymond Berkshire, mate of M.V. “Bertha Joyce”. The purpose of the communication was to let

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Raymond Berkshire know that “Delroy” had the passengers on board. He had an interest in the matter as “Bertha Joyce” had brought most of the passengers to Merasheen. “Bertha Joyce” was engaged in the same business as ”Delroy”, and was preceding “Delroy” to Arnold’s Cove. The vessels were in sight of each other but following different courses. “Delroy” was proceeding to Arnold’s Cove, keeping to the west of White Island and other islands, on the other hand, ”Bertha Joyce” was proceeding to Arnold's Cove keeping to the east of White Island and the other islands. The result was that the vessels which were, approximately, 6-8 miles apart would sometimes be in view of each other but at other times visibility was obscured by the islands. The point is that Captain Evans knew that “Bertha Joyce” was in the vicinity as he had been in radio contact with her, and after darkness fell, he could occasionally see the lights of that vessel.

At about 10:50 PM, the radar screen on “Delroy” “went black”.  At that time the master and  Clarence Evans were in the wheelhouse, the other members of the crew together with Ernest Pitcher were in the forecastle and the remainder of the passengers were in the deckhouse resting. The master, immediately, sent Clarence Evans to the forecastle to fetch the engineer who came to the wheelhouse without delay. The engineer first went to the deckhouse and examined the parts of the radar equipment situated there and then returning to the wheelhouse he lifted the hatchway to the engine room and prepared to enter. As the engineer was entering the engine room he discovered a serious fire and said to the master, "She is all a fire”. The master passed the engineer the fire extinguisher which was in the wheelhouse but the engineer was unable to enter the engine room, and he simply turned the fire extinguisher bottom up in order to operate it and, then, threw it into the engine room and closed the hatch. Meantime, the master ordered the passengers out of the deckhouse. The passengers, some of whom were roused from sleep, left the deckhouse and proceeded to the deck, as

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they were leaving the smelled smoke. There was no other sign of fire in the wheelhouse or deckhouse.

It is quite clear that while the passengers were arousing themselves and moving from the wheelhouse the life saving, distress and fire fighting equipment could have been removed from the deck house and a distress signal could have been sent by radio. Precious minutes were lost in indecision with passengers and crew outside the deckhouse so that when a decision was made by the master to try and send a distress signal it was too late for him to do so as he could not because of the presence of smoke and fumes. In the meantime, crew members and male passengers had unlashed the dory and dragged it back, amidships, by the time this was done, flames were engulfing the interior of the wheelhouse, and there had been some noise resembling a slight explosion. There was an immediate desire on the part of the passengers and crew alike to abandon ship, the dory was put over the side and unhooked, being then held only by a rope in the hands of the master. Passengers and crew scrambled into the dory and the strain caused by the forward movement of the vessel, then moving at about eight and one-half miles per hour, and the increasing weight of the dory as the passengers and crew scrambled in, was more than the master could hold and, although he was reluctant to do so, he was obliged to get into the dory and let the rope go. As he did so, the dory overturned throwing its occupants into the water.

Of the fifteen persons thrown into the water only eight were able to reach the overturned dory. These were: Reuben Evans, Leo Bullen, William Garrett, Clarence Evans, Marjorie Ennis, Judy Snow, Carmel Pitcher and Loyola Pomroy. These eight persons found themselves clinging to an overturned dory, one and one-half miles northwest of White Island at, approximately, 11:05 PM. Their situation was desperate. Leo Bullen and William Garrett decided to try to swim to White Island, they left the dory against the urgings of the master, and, undoubtedly, drowned in

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the attempt to reach White Island. The remaining six persons arranged themselves equally about the overturned dory to which they clung until rescued by M.V. “Bertha Joyce”.

“Bertha Joyce” was near Goose Island at, approximately, 11:15 PM when the mate, Raymond Berkshire of Arnold’s Cove, who was then in charge of the vessel looked in the direction of “Delroy”. He saw what he thought might be a fire. He turned “Bertha Joyce” about to investigate and after about twenty minutes he was certain that what he had seen was fire and, knowing the position of “Delroy”, he was sure that she was on fire. He continued on his course towards “Delroy” and reached her at approximately 12:15 AM 28 July. “Delroy” was then drifting. She was burning aft of the mainmast and was about one and one-half miles north west of White Island.

Raymond Berkshire noticed that the dory had been removed from “Delroy” and he assumed that those who had been on board had used dory to row to the nearest land which was White Island, accordingly, he went to White Island and circled about it using the searchlight. Finding nothing, he returned to “Delroy” keeping a good look-out all the while. He was about to make a second search towards White Island when he saw a signal on the radar screen. He went to investigate and found the overturned dory with six persons clinging to it. The dory was then about one and one-quarter miles north west of White Island.

The six survivors, Carmel Pitcher, Judy Snow, Marjorie Ennis, Loyola Pomroy, Clarence Evans, and Reuben Evan’s, were taken on board “Bertha Joyce”.  All were suffering exhaustion and one, Carmel Pitcher, was unconscious and required artificial respiration.  Raymond Berkshire questioned Loyola Pomroy about the possibility of other survivors and was told that all others were lost with the possible exception of Leo Bullen and William Garrett who had attempted to swim to White Island.  Since “Bertha Joyce” had searched from “Delroy” to White Island and back again and because Carmel Pitcher was in a critical condition and the

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weather was darkening, a decision was made to abandon the search and proceed as quickly as possible to Arnold’s Cove.

“Bertha Joyce” reached Arnold’s Cove at, approximately, 2:30 AM. Carmel Pitcher was sent, immediately, to hospital in the company of a nurse and arrangements were made for the other survivors to be sent to hospital as well. The RCMP at Clarenville were contacted by telephone and informed of the occurrence. 

After the survivors had been taken from the water, “Bertha Joyce” attempted to send a distress signal using frequency 2134. A reply was received which indicated that the distress call had been heard but that the signal was not readable. That reply had been sent by M.V. ”Island Queen” at Neal’s Harbour, Nova Scotia. Llewelyn Strong, a fisherman on ”Island Queen” had been listening on frequency 2134 when he heard the signal from “Bertha Joyce”. The signal was not readable because of static and interference but enough was read to inform “Island Queen” that a vessel was in distress. “Island Queen” notified the RCMP at Neal’s Harbour and also broadcast news of the distress on frequency 2182. V.C.O. Sydney was also notified but the only information available was that there was a vessel in distress.

“Bertha Joyce” also attempted to make direct calls to the Department of Transport stations at St. Lawrence and St. John’s using frequency 2182 but received no reply. The generator of “Bertha Joyce” caused so much interference that the engine which drove it had to be stopped if the radio was to be used and, because of the critical condition of Carmel Pitcher, it was decided not to shut down the engine but to make the best speed possible towards Arnold’s Cove. The Department of Transport stations at St. Lawrence and St. John’s, which keep a constant watch on frequency 2182, heard nothing from “Bertha Joyce”. It can only be assumed that the attempted broadcast by that vessel on frequency 2182 was vitiated by interference.

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The failure of both “Delroy” and “Bertha Joyce” to broadcast a distress signal on frequency 2182 as soon as distress became apparent should be noted although that failure did not contribute to the loss. One is left with the feeling that the crews of these small vessels are not sufficiently aware of the need to use that frequency in time of emergency.

It cannot be said, with certainty, that any reasonable thing which could have been done after the fire was discovered would have prevented the loss of life which subsequently occurred, nevertheless, it is fair to say that steps could and should have been taken which would probably have had that result. When the serious fire was discovered, the master should have taken charge and asserted his authority. A distress signal should have been sent on frequency 2182 and the distress, life saving and firefighting equipment should have been removed from the fire area and mustered with the passengers and crew in a safe place. The fire should have been fought and its progress and danger to those on board assessed.  The distress rockets should have been used in an attempt to attract the attention of others, particularly, “Bertha Joyce” which was known to be in the vicinity.

If these steps have been taken, it may not have become necessary to abandon the vessel. As events turned out, if it had been delayed for a short time, abandonment could have been done from a stopped vessel. “Delroy” stopped in less than five minutes after having been abandoned.

Abandonment of the vessel in the circumstances described was an extremely hazardous undertaking and should not have been attempted except as a last resort and then in as seaman like a manner as possible.

The evidence shows that there was an unreasonable fear of the fire which led those on board to conclude that immediate abandonment

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offered their only hope of survival and no thought was given to the risk involved.

The following recommendations are made for the Minister's consideration:

1. Masters of small vessels should be instructed in distress procedures.  Courses are available at the Fisheries College, St. John’s.
2. A card describing distress procedures should be displayed on or near every radio transmitter on board a ship.
3. A ship should be so equipped that the engines can be shut down from a remote position outside of the engine room.
4. A ship should be so equipped that it has a secondary method of steering.
5. No ship should be permitted to carry any person unless that ship has sufficient life jackets and life boat space for all persons on board.

Signed: Nathaniel Noel

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Commissioner

Editor’s note:  in his book The Deadly Sea: Life and Death on the Atlantic, Jim Wellman provides a more intimate story of the disaster based on his conversations with Loyola Pomroy and a series of articles previously published in The Navigator.